美國世界論壇網2月19日文章，原題：北京“買下”台灣的戰略：不發一槍裹挾統一

　　台灣“總統”馬英九急欲參加10月份在北京舉行的亞太經合組織峰會，與中國國家主席習近平實現歷史性會晤，以輓救自己的任期。這不是什麼秘密。

　　兩岸關係已顯著改善，但在一些關鍵政治問題上仍然分歧巨大。大陸方面清楚馬英九的無助，它最想要的是馬英九堅定承諾盡快開始政治對話。由於涉及台灣未來政治地位、國際參與、建立信任措施及和平協定，兩岸政治對話將非常複雜，也十分耗時。但大陸方面希望在馬英九在任時啟動對話，打造將台灣鎖入“一個中國”籠子的不可逆、不可變框架，這樣一來，即便2016年民進黨重新上台也不能廢除。

　　在經濟上，大陸試圖通過服貿協定推動兩岸融合。從北京的觀點看，這個協定意在發揮一種至關重要的政治和統戰作用。從香港的經歷看，協定將為大陸情報人員在台灣生活和工作提供合法掩護，便利他們積聚資源，影響和左右台灣的政治進程和政策，朝不放一槍的和平統一前進。

　　今年11月，台灣將舉行“七合一”地方公職人員選舉，2016年將舉行“總統”和“立委”選舉，國民黨很多領導人以及北京對形勢感到擔憂。北京正在尋找應對之策，最引人注目的動作在挑選台北市長候選人上。

　　連勝文擁有強大背景，在正式宣佈參選(台北市長)前就在民調中領先。他是前台灣“副總統”連戰之子，而連戰是台灣方面同北京對話的主要人物，受到北京信任。為了讓連勝文更容易勝選，北京還試圖影響民進黨以及其他反對派陣營的候選人。

　　與此同時，北京在同民進黨高層發展關係。前民進黨主席謝長廷是去年訪問大陸的最重量級民進黨人物，北京據稱也尋求2012年“總統”競選人蔡英文訪問。為發揮更大影響力，北京也試圖影響今年5月民進黨黨主席選舉。

　　據稱，前中國領導人曾表示，通過“買”而非武力統一台灣，更容易，經濟代價也更小。所以，北京一直按此邏輯行事。確實，北京對台戰略變化幅度之大、之快，出乎台灣和海外觀察人士意料。(作者帕裏斯·H·張，汪析譯)

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Beijing’s strategy to ‘buy’ Taiwan: Coerced unification without firing a shot

Special to WorldTribune.com

Parris H. Chang

It is no secret that Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou anxiously seeks to attend the APEC summit in Beijing in October and facilitate a historic meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, hoping to extricate himself from deep political woes at home and salvage his presidency.

Wang Yu-chi, left and Zhang Zhijun in Nanjing. /Simon Song/South China Morning Post

For this reason, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Minister Wang Yu-chi made a special trip to Nanjing to meet with China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun from Feb 11-15. They met briefly last October at the previous APEC meeting, but this time was to be their first substantive talk on the development of cross-strait relations between the officials in charge of Taiwan-China affairs.

The international media devoted considerable attention to the event closely watching whether the Nanjing dialogue would become a preliminary meeting to prepare for a future Ma-Xi summit.

Although cross-strait ties have improved dramatically, the two sides are still far apart on sovereignty and other key political issues, hence Director Zhang told Minister Wang that time is not yet right for Xi to meet Ma at the APEC.

However, Beijing’s response leave room for an about-face if certain demands are met and hinted that the “right” conditions must exist before Ma’s trip. Knowing fully well Ma’s helplessness, Xi could seize the opportunity to extract huge political concessions from Ma the supplicant. What Xi wants most is Ma’s firm pledge to begin cross-strait political dialogue soon.

The dialogue on cross-strait political ties — concerning Taiwan’s future political status and international participation, confidence-building measures and a peace agreement — would be extremely complicated and time-consuming. People in Taiwan, and the U.S. as well, are unlikely to allow Ma to deliver Taiwan to China.

On the other hand, Xi seeks to set the train in motion while Ma is in office and create an irreversible, irrevocable framework to lock Taiwan into the “one China” cage that could not be undone even if the DPP were to return to power in 2016.

Beijing is exerting immense pressure on the Ma regime toward more cross-strait political dialogue that will lead to a peace agreement. Ma so far has put forth a formula of “economics first, politics later” to restrict cross-strait interaction to economic relations. Displaying Beijing’s impatience with Ma’s stonewalling against cross-strait political dialogue, Xi reportedly told Ma’s special envoy to the APEC summit last October: “The issue must step by step reach a final resolution and it cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”

In economics, Beijing sought to advance cross-strait integration with a cross-strait service trade agreement.

From Beijing’s perspective, this agreement is intended also to perform vital political and united front functions in Taiwan. As shown by the experience of Hong Kong, the agreement will provide legal cover for China’s agents to live and work throughout Taiwan. Through Chinese enterprises and shops, China’s operatives would continue to build up its resources, and strengthen its capability to influence and shape Taiwan’s political process and policy efforts toward peaceful unification without firing a shot.

With the seven-in-one elections to be held in November this year and the presidential and legislative elections in 2016, many KMT leaders — and Beijing — are apprehensive that voters could reject KMT candidates in November and vote the KMT government out of office in 2016. Beijing has much at stake and is looking for ways to cope with a weakened Ma administration.

Most significantly, Beijing is attempting to hand-pick a candidate to run for the mayor’s office in Taipei.

Sean Lien has formidable credentials: He seems quite popular in Taipei and enjoys the support of the pro-China media, leading the polls even before officially having announced his candidacy. Lien comes from a wealthy and well-connected family and is the son of former vice president and former KMT chairman Lien Chan, who, as Beijing’s principal interlocutor in Taiwan, enjoys Beijing’s confidence and has met several times with Xi.

Moreover, Xi has also met Sean Lien and appears to be fond of him, joking about his height during a meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. As mayor of Taiwan’s capital, Lien would provide Beijing not just a direct link to the KMT leadership, but also a strategic power base to counterbalance Ma and post-Ma leaders, and to affect Taiwan’s cross-strait policy as well. Thus this is a race for more than the mayoralty of Taipei.

To facilitate Lien’s electoral victory, Beijing tries also to manipulate the selection of the mayoral candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the broader opposition camp. Beijing and pro-China media appear to have endorsed Ko Wen-je, a well-known physician and an independent candidate who leads most opinion polls, but has been accused of soliciting Beijing’s support during trips to China and of being Beijing’s “Manchurian candidate”.

At the same time, Beijing has cultivated links with the higher echelons of the DPP. Former premier and DPP chairman Frank Hsieh was the most prominent DPP figure to visit China last year and Beijing has reportedly also sought a visit from former DPP chairperson and 2012 presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. To exert greater influence over the DPP, Beijing also seeks to influence the election of its party chairman in May.

Former Chinese president Hu Jintao is said to have confided to his inner circles that it is both easier and less expensive to “buy” than to militarily conquer Taiwan. Hence Beijing has been steadily acting on this logic through economic means and a wily united front operation to make inroads into corporate Taiwan, the ruling and opposition parties’ media, and at the grassroots level to enhance Beijing’s outreach and control over the nation in order to bring about unification.

Beijing has eschewed the threat of force and placed greater emphasis on other means of influence to avoid possible military confrontation with the U.S., which has maintained a protective security relationship with Taiwan as mandated by its Taiwan Relations Act.

Indeed, Beijing’s approach toward Taiwan has changed so much and so quickly that it seems to be catching observers in both Taiwan and abroad dangerously off-guard.

Parris Chang is a professor emeritus of political science at Penn State University and chief executive of the Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic and Strategic Studies.